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Abstract 
Using trust games, we study how promises and messages are used to build new trust where it did 
not previously exist and to rebuild damaged trust. In these games, trustees made non-binding 
promises of investment-contingent returns, then investors decided whether to invest, and finally 
trustees decided how much to return. After an unexpected second game was announced, but 
before it commenced, trustees could send a one-way message. This design allowed us to observe 
the endogenous emergence and natural distribution of trust-relevant behaviors and focus on 
naturally occurring remedial strategies used by promise-breakers and distrusted trustees, their 
effects on investors, and subsequent outcomes. In the first game 16.6% of trustees were 
distrusted and 18.8% of trusted trustees broke promises. Trustees distrusted in the first game 
used long messages and promises closer to equal splits to encourage trust in the second game. To 
restore damaged trust, promise-breakers used apologies and upgraded promises. On average, 
investments in each game paid off for investors and trustees, suggesting that effective use of 
cheap signals fosters profitable trust-based exchange in these economies.  
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1. Introduction 
In modern economies, where trust realizes vast amounts of potential gains in transactions 
involving deferred or risky returns, problems associated with developing and restoring trust are 
particularly relevant. A scientific understanding of the processes that encourage trust where it did 
not previously exist and restore trust when it is damaged is therefore of paramount importance. 
Despite the large literature on damages to corporate reputation (e.g., see Barnett 2003 on US 
chemical industry disasters; see Robinson & Rousseau 1994 for a survey of corporate trust 
violations), very little research exists on how new trust can be encouraged where it did not 
previously exist and how damaged trust can be rebuilt (Dirks et al. 2009). Most of the existing 
research in this area (but see Fischbacher & Utikal 2010) is either exclusively theoretical 
(Lewicki & Bunker 1996; Mishra 1996; Lewicki & Wiethoff 2000; Ren & Gray 2009; Gillespie 
& Dietz 2009), based on anecdotal or archival evidence (Elsbach 1994; Knight & Pretty 1999), 
surveys (Slovic 1993), diary studies (Conway & Briner 2002) fictional vignettes (Tomlinson et 
al. 2004), videotaped dramatizations (Kim et al. 2004, 2006), or experimental designs using 
deception (Gibson et al. 1999; Bottom et al. 2002; Nakyachi & Watabe 2005; Schweitzer et al. 
2006; Ohtsubo & Watanabe 2009).  
To study how damaged trust can be rebuilt and new trust can be encouraged, we 
conducted a non-deceptive study wherein financially motivated participants used endogenously 
created and naturally distributed promises and apologies. Our study is based on a version of the 
“investment game” by Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe (1995). In the original investment game an 
investor is endowed with $10 and can invest any portion of her endowment by sending it to a 
trustee. The amount sent triples in value before reaching the trustee. Having received funds from 
this tripled investment, the trustee can reciprocate by returning any portion of these funds to the 
investor. Since sending money is risky, investments are usually interpreted as trust, and since 
returning money is costly, reciprocation via returns on investments is interpreted as evidence of 
trustworthiness1. The investment game, therefore, has been extensively used to study trust and 
                                                 
1 This interpretation is based on the assumption that participants identify and act in accordance with unstated if-then 
propositions and expect others to as well (Rousseau 1989), though there is no contract stating expected or contingent 
behavior in the classic “investment game” (see Berg et al. 1995). Because the assertion that the original game was 
universally understood to be about “trust” was debatable, John Dickhaut preferred calling it the “investment game” – 
as it is in the 1995 Berg et al. article. By adding a new starting stage to the game where trustees make promises to 
return a portion of income from investment – this game becomes a game more explicitly about trust. For this reason 
we refer to our modified form of the classic investment game, described below, as a “trust game.” 
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reciprocity in an investment setting (for a review see Ostrom & Walker 2005). A common 
finding in the literature is that investors tend to exhibit trust and trustees tend to reciprocate. It 
has also been well established that pre-play communication, even if “irrelevant” to game 
strategy, can induce higher contributions in public goods games (for meta-analyses see Sally 
1995, Balliet 2010) and more cooperation in dyadic social dilemmas (Deutsch 1958, 1960; 
Radlow & Weidner 1966; Buchan et al. 2006; Duffy & Feltovich 2006; Bracht & Feltovich 
2009). However, with the exception of a few studies using deception, the experimental economic 
literature is silent as to what behavior ensues when promises fail to establish trust and what 
happens to trust and reciprocity in subsequent interactions after promises are broken and trust is 
damaged. 
In this paper we describe a study using trust games that examines how promises and 
messages are used to build new trust where it did not previously exist and to rebuild damaged 
trust. In these games, trustees made non-binding promises of investment-contingent returns, then 
investors decided whether to invest, and finally trustees decided how much to return. After an 
unexpected second game was announced, but before it commenced, trustees could send a one-
way message. This design allowed us to observe the endogenous emergence and natural 
distribution of trust-relevant behaviors and focus on naturally occurring remedial strategies used 
by promise-breakers and distrusted trustees, their effects on investors, and subsequent outcomes. 
In the first game 16.6% of trustees were distrusted and 18.8% of trusted trustees broke promises. 
Trustees distrusted in the first game used promises closer to equal splits and – compared to 
previously trusted promise-keepers – relatively longer messages to encourage new trust in the 
second game. Promise-breakers used relatively higher new promises (compared to all other 
trustees) and messages (usually with apology) to successfully restore damaged trust. On average, 
investments in each game paid off for investors and trustees, suggesting that the context-specific 
signaling described above, can foster profitable trust-based exchanges in these economies. 
 
2. Background 
While mutually beneficial non-binding agreements help realize opportunities to gain from 
asynchronous trade, they are subject to exploitation by under-reciprocators or non-reciprocators. 
Our research focuses on trustees’ cue and signal effects on investor trust in asynchronous 
exchanges that provide opportunity for mutual advantage. In these exchanges, we define trust as 
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voluntarily ceding resources to another in the expectation that the other intends to reciprocate in 
accordance with signaled intentions. Trustworthiness is defined as reciprocation (of resources 
ceded by the investor) in accordance with signaled intentions.  
To successfully navigate a trust-based cooperative interaction and avoid exploitation by 
cheaters, it is important for investors to obtain accurate information about the ability and 
willingness (propensity) of trustees to carry out their end of the cooperative deal. Trustworthy 
reputations that have been demonstrated by past actions serve as reliable cues upon which 
investors can make trust-based decisions. In the initial interactions with unknown partners, 
informative cues about an investor’s willingness to trust or a trustee’s trustworthiness are 
unavailable. In the absence of information about the interactants’ past behavior, signals2 are 
often sent to receivers with the intention to communicate information about the sender (e.g., see 
Farrel & Rabin 1996); for example, that the sender is trustworthy. Where cues have informed 
investors of untrustworthiness, signals may be sent with the intention of persuading those 
investors that the sender is more trustworthy than inferred from those cues alone. 
Signals encouraging trust appear to be important tools for developing mutually beneficial 
relationships under conditions where trust has not yet been established and where trust has been 
damaged. Without the effective use of signals cooperative interactions may be foregone: 
potential investors may decide not to extend trust when they lack reputational information and 
when cues indicate a breach of trust. Further, when trust has been damaged, signals give 
investors access to relevant though invisible propensities of trustees, such as in the case of 
recalibrated upgrades in trustworthiness. This is true whether trust has been damaged 
intentionally or unintentionally (Axelrod & Dion 1988).  
Although signals that accurately convey behavioral propensities are potentially useful to 
both senders and receivers, signalers may send “dishonest signals” to benefit at the expense of 
receivers. Critical receivers can incur lower costs than naïve receivers (Dawkins & Krebs 1978; 
Maynard Smith 1982), and so natural selection favors those receivers who can accurately assess 
                                                 
2 We distinguish cues from signals from coercion (borrowing from similar definitions by Diggle et al. 2007; Scott-
Phillips 2008) as follows. Cue: Any behavior or feature that (i) affects the behavior of other organisms; (ii) which is 
effective because the effect has evolved to be affected by the behavior or feature; but which (iii) did not evolve. 
Signal: Any behavior or feature that (i) affects the behavior of other organisms; (ii) evolved because of those effects; 
and (iii) which is effective because the effect (the response) has evolved to be affected by the behavior or feature. 
Coercion: Any behavior or feature that (i) affects the behavior of other organisms; (ii) evolved because of those 
effects; but which (iii) is effective for some reason other than that the effect has evolved to be affected by the 
behavior or feature. 
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the cost-benefit tradeoffs associated with emitters’ signals, and calibrate their trustfulness 
accordingly. 
Zahavi (1975) addressed the question of “why are signals reliable?” suggesting that the 
high production cost of a signal guarantees its reliability, insofar as the production cost 
outweighs the benefits gained from using the signal deceptively, but not from using it honestly. 
The prototypical example is the massive and colorful peacock’s tail, indexing the peacock’s 
genetic quality for peahens’ mate selection (Petrie et al. 1991). In this system, costly signals 
persuade the receivers while cheap signals fail to do so (Zahavi 1993; Grafen 1990).  
Production costs are not the only warrantors of signal reliability, however. Human 
language, whether spoken or written, is an arbitrary communication system that often uses 
relatively cheap-to-produce signals to negotiate trust between individuals with conflicting 
interests (Lachmann et al. 2001). If these cheap signals are used by and relied upon by humans 
globally and on average, what explains the maintenance of their reliability?  
The reliability of cheap signals is supported by the actuality or threat of social sanctions 
that can more than offset the short-term benefits of cheating and deception (Rohwer 1977; 
Kiyonari et al. 2000; Masclet et al. 2003). A selective regime characterized by repeated 
interactions among known others (Kelly 1995) has led to psychological mechanisms for social 
exchange that balance (i) the costs of mistaking a one-shot interaction for a repeated interaction 
with (ii) the far greater costs of mistaking a repeated interaction for a one-shot interaction 
(Delton et al. 2011). Hence, participants in explicitly one-shot anonymous experiments often 
behave as if they expect repeated interactions with trustworthy, intrinsically valuable partners 
(e.g., see Hoffman et al. 1996; Kiyonari et al. 2000).  
While the sanctioning of false signals and our tendency to err to caution may reduce the 
frequency of false signals in a population, those individuals who expect to escape sanctions may 
be more motivated to use signals deceptively. In economies where opportunity costs of forgone 
trust-based exchange are larger, receivers tend to tolerate greater proportions of false signals to 
honest signals. Specifically, the logic of error management theory (for a review see Haselton & 
Nettle 2006) predicts that despite the existence of false signaling and the costs of receiving false 
signals, signals will tend to be received when opportunity costs associated with not receiving true 
signals of trustworthiness (from forgone advantageous exchange) are greater than costs 
associated with receiving false signals of trustworthiness (i.e., when the consequent exchange 
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produces a loss). This economically justified tolerance of a rate of false signaling also predicts 
that individuals will exploit opportunities to use deception. This study explores the use of cheap 
signals (e.g., promises of reciprocation, personalized messages, and apologies) that do not 
directly affect payoffs of the game, or require monetary costs for production, yet are common 
features of trust-based interactions. Personalized communication may improve cooperation 
(Orbell et al. 1988; Bohnet & Frey 1999; Ridings et al. 2002; Zheng et al. 2002; Buchan et al. 
2006) by facilitating coordination, decreasing social distance, raising solidarity, and providing 
the cues of familiarity that are normally associated with trustworthy relationships. Non-binding 
promises have also been shown to increase cooperation (Rubin & Brown 1975; Kerr & 
Kaufman-Gilliland 1994; Elingsen & Johannesson 2004; Charness & Dufwenberg 2006). In 
relationships where trust has been damaged, apologies and explanations have been shown to 
elicit forgiveness (Ohbuchi et al. 1989; Tavuchis 1991; Lewicki & Bunker 1996; Benoit & Drew 
1997; Girard & Mullet 1997; McCullough et al. 1997, 1998; Girard et al. 2002; Witvliet et al. 
2002) and promote future trust (De Cremer et al. 2010). These strategies are based on signals that 
are cheap to produce, raising the questions of how people use signals in these contexts; when the 
signals achieve their intended effects; and who benefits from their use.  
In sum, while cheap signals are helpful for building new trust and rebuilding damaged 
trust to achieve efficient outcomes, they can be used deceptively and may be distrusted, making 
their reliability tenuous. Therefore, we expect that in our experiment trustees whose actions have 
already produced reliable cues establishing their trustworthy reputations (by keeping promises 
and not succumbing to more profitable opportunism) will be less incentivized (than previously 
distrusted trustees, or trustees whose reputations indicate untrustworthiness) to spend time and 
effort constructing messages to persuade investors to trust them, when those messages might be 
distrusted. Previously distrusted trustees who have not established trustworthiness and 
untrustworthy trustees (i.e., promise-breakers) are expected to make use of promises and 
messages in an attempt to affect investors’ decisions to trust. We also expect that when used and 
“working” to affect investors’ trust, signals conveying a trustworthy propensity will provide 
benefits to both investor and trustee on average. 
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3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at Chapman University’s ESI laboratory. 458 participants 
(229 pairs) were recruited from a standard campus-wide subject pool for participation in an 
experiment that could last up to 45 minutes. Participants interacted with each other anonymously 
over a local computer network. The experiment, which lasted an average of 35 minutes total and 
did not involve deception, proceeded as follows. Upon arrival, participants in the experiment 
were told that they would receive $7 for participation, to be paid at the end of the experiment. 
Participants then received instructions (see Appendix A) for a single trust game with (i) no 
indication of a subsequent game to follow and (ii) no promises that the experiment would end at 
conclusion of that game. 
Participants were assigned to one of two roles: “Participant A” (investor), or “Participant 
B” (trustee). First, the trustee completed the following standardized statement (which we will 
refer to below as a promise) by selecting a natural number amount from 0 to 20: “I (Participant 
B) promise to transfer back $___ of my income to you (Participant A) if you choose IN”. This 
statement was not binding, however. That is, the trustee was not obligated to transfer back the 
amount promised to the investor, and both trustee and investor knew this. The computer 
conveyed the trustee’s statement to the investor and then the investor chose either OUT or IN. If 
the investor chose OUT, she received $5 and the trustee $0. If the investor chose IN, then the 
trustee received $20 (the “income”), after which he selected a whole dollar amount from $0 to 
$20 to send back to the investor. 
After the first trust game (Game 1) finished, participants were given instructions (see 
Appendix A) indicating that a second trust game (Game 2) would follow. In Game 2, participants 
were told they would remain in the same roles and interact with the same partner as in Game 1. 
However, prior to Game 2, the trustee was given an opportunity to use a text box to send a one-
way message to the investor. Trustees were told that “in these messages, no one is allowed to 
identify him or herself by name, number, gender, or appearance,” but that other than these 
restrictions, trustees could “say anything in the message.” If trustees wished not to send a 
message they were instructed to “simply click on the send button without having typed anything 
in the message box.” The computer conveyed the trustee’s message and subsequently the 
standardized promise to the investor, and then Game 2 proceeded. We specified that Game 2, 
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which had the same rules as Game 1, was the last and final part of the experiment (i.e., there 
would be no subsequent games).3 
There were 25 experimental sessions. Each session had between 10 and 24 participants. 
The average experimental earnings were $18, ranging from a $0 to $40, plus $7 for arriving to 
the experiment on time and participating. No participant participated more than once, and no 
participant had prior experience with a similar game environment.  
 
4. Results 
4.1. Game 1 
We expect that trustees, aware of investor self-interest and motives for critical signal 
reception, would promise investors transfers of at least $6 (minimally higher than the payoff to 
the investor if he chooses OUT) but less than $20 (which would provide no benefit to the 
promise-maker). Two plausible focal points for promised return amounts are the midpoint of the 
$6-$19 range, $12.5 (though only whole dollar amounts like $12 or $13 could be chosen), and 
the even-split of $10. Wary that trustees’ may have less incentive to honor promises closer to 
$20 than to the even-split amount of $10, we also expect that investors should be more 
suspicious of the veracity of higher promises and therefore less likely to invest in higher 
promises. If the mind errs to caution, as we have suggested, and interprets the one-shot game as 
potentially repeatable, trustees who have been trusted should reciprocate enough to, at minimum, 
provide investors profitable returns on their investments. These predictions stand in stark 
contrast to the rational (non-cooperative) choice predictions that expect non-binding promises to 
have no effect on investors. According to rational choice theory, trustees who receive incomes 
should return nothing (despite what they may have promised) and, based on this, investors 
should always choose to not invest (regardless of the promise they received).  
Figure 1 displays the aggregate distribution of investment and promise-keeping decisions 
in the experiment, while Figure 2 displays the distribution of promises made by trustees in Game 
1. In Game 1, trustees on average promised to return $9.20 (SD=2.38) out of $20 and 83.4% 
(191/229) of investors chose IN. 
                                                 
3 After each trust game participants were also asked to fill out a 20 item survey in which they reported their 
emotional states consequent on their decisions, game interactions, and resulting outcomes. Analysis and discussion 
of the mediating roles of emotions are not included in this paper. 
 9 
 
First we evaluate the distributions of Game 1 promises associated with trusting and 
distrusting decisions, respectively, and how these investment decisions affected investor and 
trustee earnings. The distribution of promises in Figure 2 indicates that investors who chose IN 
received promises in the range of $6-$19 (99% of the time), with promises of $12 or $13 
relatively uncommon (1% of the time), and the promise of $10 most common (more than 50% of 
the time). Investors who chose OUT received lower promises on average (i.e., M1=$8.61 
(SD1=4.33) versus M2=$9.31 (SD2=1.75); Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value=0.01, n1=191, 
n2=38), and, compared to trusted promises, received either relatively low or relatively high 
promises overall. To confirm this observation, we estimate probit models (see Table 1, 
specifications 1 and 2), where the dependent variable is the investment decision in Game 1 and 
the independent variables are dummy variables for promises less than $9 and greater than $11, as 
well as the amounts of these promises. In specification (1), the dummy variables are negative and 
significant, indicating that investors are less likely to invest when promises are either relatively 
low or relatively high. Moreover, specification (2) indicates that, among promises lower than $9, 
there is a positive correlation between the amount promised and the probability of investment. 
On the other hand, among promises higher than $11, there is a negative correlation between the 
amount promised and the probability of investment. In other words, promises closer to the even-
split of $10 elicit a higher rate of IN responses. 
In Game 1, investment yielded greater payoffs than non-investment for both investors 
and trustees. Investors who chose IN received back $8.19 on average, which is more than their 
original endowment of $5 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value<0.01, n=191). Trusted trustees 
earned an average of $11.81, more than the $0 of distrusted trustees (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-
value<0.01, n1=38, n2=191). The OLS estimation of specifications (3) and (4) in Table 1 
indicates that the amount returned by trustee is correlated with the amount promised. 
Specifically, specification (3) indicates that both low and high promises are followed by lower 
returned amounts. Moreover, specification (4) indicates that amount returned increases as it gets 
closer to the even-split promise of $10. These results support the rationale for why investors 
receiving especially high or low promises should tend to choose OUT.  
For the investors who chose IN, the mean amount returned of $8.19 was significantly 
lower than the mean trusted promise of $9.31 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value<0.01, 
n1=n2=191). Despite mean returns being lower than promised, we find that promises tended to be 
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veridical: 81.2% of trusted promises (155/191) were kept (i.e., the amount returned was equal to 
or greater than the promise), and 18.8% (36/191) were broken (i.e., the amount returned was less 
than the promise). Below we use the terms “promise-keepers” and “promise-breakers” to refer to 
trusted trustees who exactly met or exceeded their promised amounts, and who returned less than 
their promised amounts (whether the returns were monetarily profitable to the investors or not), 
respectively. 
 
4.2. Game 2 
While cheap signals are manipulated by trustees, affect investors, and provide net 
benefits to both investors and trustees in Game 1, facilitating profitable trust-based exchanges 
where previous reputations had not been established, Game 2 provides us a relatively different 
game environment in which to study cheap signals. In Game 2, reputations have been established 
for many investors and trustees – raising the question of whether the use of cheap signals will 
still matter where cues of trusting and trustworthy behavior (or its absence) are available. 
In Game 2, trustees promised to return $9.79 on average, a higher amount than the mean 
of $9.20 promised in Game 1 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value<0.01, n=229). Game 2 
promises resulted in 87.3% (200/229) of investors choosing IN, only slightly more than the 
83.4% (191/229) of IN decisions made in Game 1 (Fisher's exact test, p-value=0.59, n=229). 
Trustee reputation as established in Game 1 and the new promises issued in Game 2 affected 
investment decisions in Game 2. The estimation of probit models (specifications 1 and 2 in Table 
2)4 indicates that both promise-breaking in Game 1 and promises lower than the even-split in 
Game 2 elicited less investment decisions in Game 2. Overall, the investments made in Game 2 
paid off. Investors who chose IN received back $8.73 on average, which is more than the OUT 
payoff of $5 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value<0.01, n=200). Trusted trustees earned an 
average of $11.27, more than the $0 of distrusted trustees (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-
value<0.01, n1=29, n2=200). The estimation of specifications (3) and (4) in Table 2 indicates that 
higher promises in Game 1, a greater extent of under-return relative to promise in Game 1, and 
uneven split promises in Game 2 all predict lower amounts returned in Game 2. Overall, and 
similar to Game 1, promises in Game 2 tended to be veridical; 75% of promises (150/200) were 
                                                 
4 In estimation of Table 2, we have excluded variables corresponding to the amount promised in Game 1 (i.e., 
Promise1<9 × Promise1 and Promise1>11 × Promise1), since these variables are highly correlated with returns. 
Nevertheless, even when these variables are included the estimates in Table 2 are very similar. 
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kept or exceeded, and 25.0% (50/200) were broken. In the sections below we further explore the 
effects of promises and messages on Game 2 investments and earnings across different “types” 
of dyads aggregated by Game 1 decisions. 
 
4.2.1. Promise-Keepers  
For the subset of 155 Game 1 promise-keeping trustees, we observe higher average 
promises in Game 2. Figure 3 displays the distribution of Game 2 promises resulting in IN and 
OUT made by these promise-keepers. Overall, this set of trustees promised to return an average 
of $9.46 in Game 2, which is higher than their average promise of $9.02 in Game 1 (Wilcoxon 
signed rank test, p-value<0.01, n1=n2=155). 
Perhaps as a consequence of promise-keepers’ demonstrated trustworthiness in Game 1, 
the Game 2 investment rate of 92.3% (143/155) in Game 1 promise-keepers was higher than the 
overall investment rate of 83.4% (191/229) in Game 1 (Fisher's exact test, p-value<0.01, n1=155, 
n2=229). Specifications (1) and (2) in Table 3 indicate that messages with content and promises 
closer to the even split of $10 positively affected investment in promise-keepers.5  
We expected that, due to the greater reliability of available behavioral cues which 
demonstrated their trustworthiness (relative to the reliability of a cheap signal), Game 1 promise-
keepers would be less inclined than promise-breakers and distrusted trustees to construct 
messages for the purpose of persuading investors to choose IN in Game 2, and so would send 
both shorter messages and a higher proportion of empty messages in Game 2. Supporting that 
expectation, Game 1 promise-keepers’ messages contained fewer words than those from the set 
including both Game 1 distrusted trustees and Game 1 promise-breakers (M1=11.41 (SD1=11.94) 
versus M2=22.9 (SD2=22.37); Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p<0.01, n1=155, n2=74). Game 1 
promise-keepers’ messages were also more frequently empty than those from the set of both 
Game 1 distrusted trustees and Game 1 promise-breakers (20.6% versus 10.8% of the time; 
Fisher’s exact test, p-value=0.05, n=229). 
Investments in Game 1 promise-keepers paid off for investors choosing IN in Game 2. 
These investors received an average of $8.62 from trustees, as opposed to the $5 earned from 
                                                 
5 Note that in estimating these regressions we cannot include both returns in Game 1 and promises in Game 1 since 
for promise-keepers they are perfectly correlated. Moreover, we had to omit variable Promise2>11 × Promise2 
since there are only three observations greater than $11, which makes Promise2>11 and Promise2>11 × Promise2 
almost perfectly correlated.  
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OUT (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value<0.01, n=143), with 83.9% (120/143) of the promises 
kept or exceeded, and 16.1% (23/143) broken. Compared to $0 earned by those Game 1 promise-
keepers that were not trusted in Game 2, promise-keepers also profited from trusted promises in 
Game 2, earning $11.38 on average (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value<0.01, n1=12, n2=143). 
Specifications (3) and (4) in Table 3 indicate that Game 2 promises lower and higher than the 
even-split are associated with lower and higher amounts returned by Game 1 promise-keepers, 
respectively. Whether the messages have content or not, on the other hand, has no effect on 
returns. 
 
4.2.2. Promise-Breakers   
A major question our data address concerns what happens after a breach of trust when a 
fresh opportunity for cooperation arises: How trustees behave, how investors respond, and what 
outcomes are achieved. Here we focus on the 18.8% (36/191) of pairs with broken promises in 
Game 1 (i.e., where the amount returned was lower than the amount promised). These broken 
promises represent breaches of trust and the relationships that immediately follow are considered 
to have damaged trust (because trust-based expectations were not met). A central question 
motivating this study is whether signals such as new promises and apologies can (i) restore 
investors’ willingness to trust and (ii) facilitate the achievement of higher joint payoffs.  
Figure 4 displays the distribution of promises made by 36 Game 1 promise-breakers in 
Game 2 resulting in IN and OUT decisions. Promise-breakers promised $12.11 in Game 2, 
which is significantly higher than their average promise of $10.58 in Game 1 (Wilcoxon signed 
rank test, p-value=0.01, n1=n2=36). The extent of upgraded promises (Promise2-Promise1) by 
promise-breakers is also significantly higher than the extent of upgraded promises by promise-
keepers (M1=1.53 (SD1=3.70) versus M2=0.44 (SD2=1.79); Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-
value<0.01, n1=36, n2=155). Assuming that many of the investors whose trust had previously 
been damaged would be inclined to choose OUT, it appears that promise upgrades partially 
restore trust, since 69.4% (25/36) of investors whose trust was damaged in Game 1 chose IN 
again. 
In addition to promise upgrades, we also find that Game 1 promise-breakers frequently 
used messages. Table C1 in Appendix C reports all messages that were sent by 36 promise-
breakers. Analyzing the messages, we find that 83.3% (30/36) of the messages have some 
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content.6 Game 1 promise-breakers’ messages contain more words than messages from Game 1 
promise-keepers (M1=19.06 (SD1=19.03) versus M2=11.41 (SD2=11.94); Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test, p-value=0.03, n1=36, n2=155), suggesting that the behavioral cue of trustworthiness made 
verbal persuasion for continued investment less determinant of re-investment and less necessary 
for trustees.  
To further classify all 36 messages, we used an incentivized laboratory coordination 
game (Houser & Xiao 2011). Three coders recruited from the subject pool and blind to the 
hypotheses7 were asked to code each message twice: first based on whether or not it conformed 
to a “broad” definition of apology (an explicit or implicit acknowledgment of offense), and 
second based on whether or not it conformed to a “narrow” definition of apology (an explicit or 
implicit acknowledgment of offense, along with remorse, regret, or sorrow stemming from 
acknowledgment of the offense). All 6 messages without content were coded by all coders as not 
conforming to the broad definition and not conforming to the narrow definition of apology. Of 
the 30 messages with content, 28 were coded by the majority of coders as conforming to the 
broad definition of apology and 13 were coded by the majority of coders as conforming to the 
narrow definition of apology.8 
When using a broad definition of apology, which was coded with “substantial” agreement 
(Kappa of 0.70), we find that 82.1% (23/28) of apologizers were retrusted in Game 2 in 
comparison to only 25.0% (2/8) of non-apologizers (Fisher’s exact test, p-value<0.01, n=36), 
suggesting that messages with apology are more likely to restore trust after broken promises than 
empty messages or messages without apology. 9  Due to the lower interrater reliability for 
messages coded according to the narrow definition, we will consider only the broad definition of 
apology in the subsequent analyses.  
                                                 
6 We find that 80% (24/30) of messages with content restored trust (i.e., where investors chose IN in Game 2 after 
having suffered broken promises in Game 1), as opposed to only 16.7% (1/6) of messages without content. These 
differences are significant (Fisher’s exact test, p-value<0.01, n=36). 
7 The instructions for coders and details about how they were paid are attached in Appendix B. Coders each earned 
an average of $28.33 for matched codings, plus $7 for arriving on time and participating. 
8 We use a standard approach from content analysis methodology to calculate Cohen’s Kappa interrater agreement 
coefficient (Cohen 1960; Krippendorff 2004). Kappa values between 0.41 and 0.60 are considered “Moderate” 
agreement, and those above 0.60 indicate “Substantial” agreement (Landis & Koch 1977). We find Kappa values of 
0.70 and 0.53 for the broad and narrow definitions of apology, respectively. 
9 When using a narrow definition of apology, which was coded with moderate agreement (Kappa of 0.53), we find 
that 84.6% (11/13) of apologizers were retrusted in comparison to only 60.9% (14/23) of non-apologizers (Fisher’s 
exact test, p-value=0.13, n=36). 
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Thus far, we have only considered the independent effects of new promises and apologies 
in restoring damaged trust, but recognize that these remedial strategies are often used jointly. 
Among Game 1 promise-breakers, the size of the upgrade in amount promised is significantly 
larger for participants issuing apologies than for those who did not (M1=$1.68 (SD1=3.10) versus 
M2=$1 (SD2=5.55); Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value=0.05, n1=28, n2=10). When the apologetic 
promise-breakers are compared to all other trustees the difference is even larger. The upgrade in 
amount promised for apologetic trustees is almost four times greater than among all other 
trustees (M1=$1.68 (SD1=3.10) versus M2=$0.44 (SD2=2.68); Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-
value=0.05, n1=28, n2=201), indicating that apologetic trustees upgraded their promises most.  
Next, we estimate probit regressions (see Table 4) to identify how these remedial 
strategies work in conjunction. Specification (1) indicates that the two most significant predictors 
of trust in Game 2 are promise adjustments (specifically promise upgrades) and apologies. 
Specification (2) shows that in addition trust is negatively affected by the extent of under-return 
relative to Game 1 promise. Moreover, based on the likelihood-ratio test, we find that the 
promise adjustment, upgraded relative to the extent of under-return on previously broken 
promise (i.e., Promise2-(Promise1-Return1)), positively and significantly influences trust in 
Game 2 (likelihood-ratio test, p-value=0.05). These results indicate that investors’ decisions to 
re-invest are sensitive not just to the existence of broken promises (specifications 1 and 2 in 
Table 2), but also to the extent of under-return relative to Game 1 promise, apologies, and 
upgraded promises (specifications 1 and 2 in Table 4). 
We have argued that signals such as apologies and promises should have evolved only if 
they provided net benefits to both the senders and receivers of those signals on average and over 
the evolution of the communication system. We evaluate whether Game 1 promise-breakers’ 
signals resulted in benefits for both investor and trustee in Game 2, and whether these signals 
were reliable indicators of subsequent trustee behaviors. Investors in Game 1 promise-breakers 
were returned $7.28 on average, which is significantly higher than the OUT payoff of $5 
(Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value=0.05, n=25). Moreover, Game 1 promise-breakers returned 
significantly more in Game 2 than in Game 1 (M1=$7.28 (SD1=4.86) versus M2=$4.60 
(SD2=3.72); Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value<0.01, n1=n2=25). This is also true when we look 
at investments in the subset of 23 out of 28 trustees who issued apologies and where retrusted: 
they returned significantly more in the second game (M1=$7.52 (SD1=4.81) versus M2=$4.61 
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(SD2=3.64); Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value<0.01, n=23), which is also significantly higher 
than the OUT payoff (M1=$7.52 (SD1=4.81) versus M2=$5; Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-
value=0.03, n=23). 
Although investments in Game 2 paid off, we still find that 60.0% (15/25) of re-trusted 
promise-breakers subsequently broke their promises again in Game 2 – almost irrespective of the 
apologies and new adjusted promises. From specifications (3) and (4) in Table 4, it appears that 
neither promises adjustments, new amounts promised, nor apologies are predictive of return in 
Game 2. The only variable that predicts return in Game 2 is return in Game 1. 
 
4.2.3. Distrusted  
As mentioned above, 16.6% of trustees (38 out of 229) were not trusted in Game 1 (see 
Figure 1). The source of this distrust appears to be: (i) the higher variance around the even-split 
point of the distribution of distrusted promises (relative to that of the distribution of trusted 
promises; see right panel of Figure 2), and (ii) a lower degree of default trustfulness among 
Game 1 distrustful investor (accounting for the fact that a sizeable number of even-split promises 
were rejected). In particular, in Game 1, 55.3% (21/38) of distrusted trustees promised less than 
$9 while another 10.5% (4/38) of them promised more than $11. As with our Game 1 predictions 
of trusted promises, we expect that previously distrusted trustees would adjust their Game 2 
promises towards the modal and more trusted promise of $10, that these adjustments would 
affect decisions to invest, and that investments made based on adjusted promises would benefit 
both the investor and trustee.  
First we evaluate whether Game 1 distrusted trustees adjust their promises as we 
expected, and if adjustments of promises by Game 1 distrusted trustees affect investment 
decisions. Trustees who were distrusted in Game 1 promised an average of $8.92 in Game 2, 
which is similar to their average promise of $8.61 in Game 1 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-
value=0.45, n1=n2=38), yet most investors (84.2% or 32/38) who did not trust in Game 1 chose 
IN in Game 2. Figure 5 displays the histogram of promises made in Game 2 by the 38 trustees 
who were distrusted in Game 1. Distrusted trustees changed their distribution of promises 
towards more equal splits: 66.7% (14/21) of trustees who promised less than $9 in Game 1 
increased their Game 2 promises and 100% (4/4) of trustees who promised more than $11 in 
Game 1 decreased their Game 2 promises. Correspondingly, among previously un-trusting 
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investors, 92.6% (13/14) of those who received increased promises and 100% (4/4) of those who 
received the decreased promises chose IN in Game 2. 
Next, we analyze whether new trust in previously distrusted trustees can be statistically 
attributed to how distrusted trustees utilized messages and adjusted promises. We expect that 
distrusted trustees would construct longer messages (to persuade investors to choose IN in Game 
2) than trustees who had already established reputations of trustworthiness. Table C2 in 
Appendix C reports the messages that were sent by 38 trustees who were distrusted in Game 1. 
Analyzing these messages, we find that 94.7% (36/38) of the messages used by distrusted 
trustees have some content. Messages from Game 1 distrusted trustees contain more words than 
messages from Game 1 promise-keepers (M1=26.58 (SD1=24.83) versus M2=11.41 (SD2=11.94); 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p<0.01, n1=38, n2=155). These data suggest that distrusted trustees use 
both promise adjustments towards 50/50 divisions of income and longer messages to persuade 
investors to trust them. The estimation of specification (1) in Table 5 indicates that the 
investment decision in Game 2 is positively correlated with the amount of $10 promised in Game 
2 (p-value=0.06), but that message length is not significant. The Game 2 rate of trust-extension 
for Game 1 distrustful investors was 84.2% (32/38). This is very similar to the original 
unconditional investment rate of 83.4% in Game 1. 
Finally, we evaluate whether promises used by Game 1 distrusted trustees facilitated 
higher joint payoff in Game 2, and whether those promises were reliable indications of 
subsequent trustee behavior. Game 2 investments made in previously distrusted trustees paid off 
for both investors and trustees. Investors in Game 1 distrusted trustees were returned on average 
$6.88, which is significantly higher than the OUT payoff of $5 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-
value=0.05, n=32) and the newly trusted trustees earned an average of $13.12.  
On average, newly trusted trustees’ promises were veridical – 62.5% (20/32) kept their 
promises. On the other hand, 37.5% (12/32) of that set broke their promises – more than the 
18.8% of trusted trustees who broke their promises in Game 1 (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.05, 
n1=32, n2=191). One possibility is that the excess promise-breaking of newly trusted trustees 
reflects a reaction against investors’ lack of trust in Game 1, perhaps based on a sense of 
entitlement for the profits that could have been earned had trust been extended in Game 1. By 
breaking their promises these presumed punishers ended up earning an average of $17.42 in two 
games, closer to the average earning of $21.99 across two games for Game 1 trusted trustees, 
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than the average earnings of $10.55 for newly trusted trustees who did not break promises in 
Game 2. The estimation of specification (2) in Table 5 does not reveal any significant predictor 
for amount returned by trustees in Game 2. 
 
5. Discussions and Conclusions 
Opportunities for mutual gains often exist where previous exchange histories have not 
yet been developed or where trust has been damaged by expectations not met. While promises 
and apologies appear to be important tools for building and rebuilding trust in these problematic 
situations, most of the research on these remedial strategies is based on self-report, anecdotal, or 
archival evidence, or else experiments based on fictional vignettes, videotaped dramatization, or 
deception. By using a non-deceptive study wherein financially motivated participants used 
endogenously created and naturally distributed promises and apologies we demonstrate that 
trustees send cheap signals to encourage new trust and rebuild damaged trust, and that these 
signals are often effective, leading to benefits for both investor and trustee.  
From the egoist perspective of non-cooperative game theory no cooperation is predicted, 
yet our experiment yielded high rates of trust-extending behavior (e.g. 83.4% in Game 1) and 
trust-reextension (88% of those who went IN in Game 1 went In in Game 2). There are several 
non-exclusive accounts for these results. Profit-seeking investors need to trade the risk of trusting 
under-reciprocators against the risk of not trusting reciprocators. 10  As the efficiency of the 
investment increases, so do the possible forgone benefits for investors who choose OUT. While 
the multiplier of 4 used in our study, higher than the multiplier of 3 used in standard trust games, 
might have contributed to investor willingness to choose IN, these effects are not commonly 
found across trust games. A meta-analysis by Johnson & Mislin (2011), examining games with 
different multipliers to evaluate whether a higher multiplier might increase the likelihood of 
investment, found no effect of multiplier on investors and a strong negative effect on 
trustworthiness: a higher multiplier decreases the amount of money returned by a receiver.  
Another possibility, which our data suggests, is that promises in our game may have 
enhanced the trust extension rate (consistent with Charness & Dufwenberg 2006, who showed IN 
rates of 74% with promises), and that the apologies issued may have enhanced the trust re-
                                                 
10 In Game 1, for instance, investors who chose IN received back $8.19 on average, which is significantly higher 
than their alternative OUT payoff of $5. Despite the sizeable rate of under-reciprocation in Game 1, decisions to 
take on risk by choosing IN yielded higher profits for investors than decisions to not take on risk by choosing OUT. 
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extension rate, despite broken promises in Game 1. Although we lack experimental controls 
without signals, within sample comparisons suggest that investors lent credence to specific 
formulations of trustees’ promises, and conditioned their credence to these promises in Game 2 
according to cues of trustworthiness and untrustworthiness (i.e., kept promises and broken 
promise, respectively). We expected that trustees, aware of investor self-interest and motives for 
critical signal reception, would promise investors mutually beneficial transfers in the range $6 to 
$19. Consistent with results from bargaining games (where even splits are reported as modal 
offers that also tend to be accepted; see Guth et al. 1982; Guth & Tietz 1986; Carter & Irons 
1991; Prasnikar & Roth 1992), even-split promises, which lay close to the middle of the 
predicted range, elicited more trust-extension than uneven-split promises among dyads with no 
history of trust-based exchange.  
We have argued that as long as the truth value of a signal can be reliably estimated, and 
updated in tandem with estimates of the signaler’s trustworthiness, cheap-to-produce signals 
such as promises can facilitate coordination and cooperation. In the context of repeated 
interactions, promises and apologies should be less trusted when issued by trustees whose past 
promises and apologies were followed by untrustworthy behavior. The proverbial boy who cried 
wolf illustrates this principle in the domain of predator calls. But does the principle apply in the 
domain of social exchange? Our experimental design did not include a third game, so we cannot 
know whether the investors who suffered broken promises in Game 1, were apologized to, and 
again suffered broken promises in Game 2, would have discounted further apologies. Future 
research with similar designs but more than two successive games is needed to test the prediction 
that the credibility attributed to apologies would be recalibrated based on subsequent behavior by 
offenders. However, our results do provide a partial answer to the question of how signal 
credibility is calibrated by relevant behavioral cues: as evidenced by Game 2 investment rates, 
Game 2 promises issued by trustees who previously returned less than promised were given less 
credence than the Game 2 promises issued by trustworthy trustees. 
Nevertheless, among investors whose trust was damaged in Game 1, messages with 
apologies elicited more re-extension of trust than messages without apologies. While Game 2 
promise upgrades might signal intention to provide an economic contribution towards restituting 
the previously promised amount lost (i.e., atonement: a repair done for the sake of a damaged 
relationship), they could also be attempts at coercion: promise-breakers’ coaxing efforts – 
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calibrated to compensate for the investor’s expectation that their Game 2 promises would be 
“exaggerated” (i.e., as they were in Game 1). The former explanation suggests an upgraded 
regard for the investor, the latter a strategically selfish regard. Evidence from our experiment 
suggests that most promise breakers upgraded their Game 2 promises out of selfish-regard, since 
the majority (60%) of promise-breakers who were invested in again went on to break promises a 
second time. 
We suggest that the rate of trust re-extension seen for trustees who turned out to be 
repeat promise-breakers may have been lower outside of the laboratory, where emotional states 
are reliably communicated through other forms simultaneously (e.g., facial expressions, voice, 
body language) and in concert with additional reputational information and opportunities to 
sanction cheating. We suspect that in the “real world” of non-anonymous and face-to-face 
interactions, persuasive messages like promises and apologies are likely more effective and less 
likely to lead to further damaged trust because receivers can evaluate the veracity of verbal 
messages based on their correspondence with other reliable cues and signals (e.g., past 
demonstrations of trust or trustworthiness, facial expressions, tone of voice, eye movements, 
body language).11 
From this study we see evidence indicating how personal exchanges are often based 
around establishment of trust via cheap-to-produce verbal signals, and how these signals can 
encourage new trust where it did not previously exist or repair trust where it had been damaged. 
Not only is this important information that could improve understanding of what to expect from 
our everyday interpersonal relationships, it is information that complements our understanding of 
how market exchange systems (where interactions often take place between non-personal entities 
such as firms), politics, law, and religion are sometimes expected to work, with personal 
representatives making verbal and written promises of reciprocation or atonement or else issuing 
apologies and personalized messages. Both interpersonal interactions and markets are built on 
the ancient human foundations of adaptive giving and receiving. As such, trust-based exchanges 
at any level are often based around establishment of trust via signals such as verbal claims about 
reputation, verbal contracts, and apologies. 
                                                 
11 Hirshleifer (1984) theorized that emotions act as “guarantors of threats and promises” and several authors (Van 
Kleef et al. 2004, 2006; Sinaceur & Tiedens 2006; Wubben et al. 2008; Stouten & De Cremer 2010) have 
demonstrated experimentally that displays of emotion (including anger, guilt, happiness, disappointment, worry, 
regret) are used by observers for subsequent decision making in social dilemmas and negotiations.  
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Based on our findings and a review of the current literature we suggest three steps that 
can be taken as a remedial strategy to restore damaged trust. First, when trust in a relationship 
has been damaged, the offender should recognize the offense and any regret or sorrow stemming 
from having caused the offense (such as through some form of apology). An optimistic 
perspective on relationships fraught with damaged trust recognizes that they actually represent 
opportunities to develop better relations than previously established. Second, to persuade and 
assure victims that relationship repair is possible the offender should signal (such as with a 
personalized message) an indication of the value that is recognized in the other, which stems 
from an internal recalibrations and commits one (such as with a promise) to expectations of 
future cooperative behavior. In signaling recognition of relationship value it is important not to 
express a selfish perspective, but instead a shared-welfare or other-regarding perspective. Third, 
to actually begin the process of changing and redefining the relationship, an offender must be 
willing to pay costs to expeditiously correct the previous imbalance of welfare (thereby 
increasing the offended party’s welfare), or else to sacrifice wealth or status (thereby decreasing 
one’s own welfare). When corrective actions cannot be immediately taken, signals of intent to 
take corrective actions should be used. These three steps are identified as each having 
independent effects of improving impressions of the offender (Scher & Darley 1997; Schlenker 
1980) and are consistent with the proscriptions detailed by De Cremer (2010) for the financial 
world to restore their damaged trust with customers, as well as the general conclusions arrived at 
by Lazare (2004).  
As the natural occurrence of deceit in social exchanges is sampled and the effectiveness 
of strategies, tools, and institutions used to combat it are evaluated, practical insights are gleaned 
that can be extended to our personal lives, to the work of policy makers, and even applied to the 
practices of firms, religious clergy, and military relations. We strongly encourage further efforts 
to uncover effective strategies for building trust where previous trust-based exchange histories 
had not been developed, or where trust had been damaged by reciprocation failure. 
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Table 1: Game 1 Determinants of Investment and Return 
Dependent variable Invest1 Invest1 Return1 Return1 
Specification 
(1) 
Probit 
(2) 
Probit 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
Promise1<9 -0.83*** -4.81*** -1.77*** -6.92** 
    [dummy for promises less than 9 in  Game1] (0.21) (1.07) (0.41) (2.77) 
Promise1<9 × Promise1   0.60***  0.72* 
    [amount promised in Game1 for promises < 9]  (0.16)  (0.38) 
Promise1>11 -1.01** 8.44 -4.52*** 12.30* 
    [dummy for promises greater than 11 in Game1] (0.41) (5.19) (0.95) (6.62) 
Promise1>11 × Promise1   -0.55*  -1.11** 
    [amount promised in Game1 for promises > 11]  (0.30)  (0.43) 
Constant 1.35*** 1.35*** 8.81*** 8.81*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.21) (0.21) 
Observations 229 229 191 191 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
 
Table 2: Game 2 Determinants of Investment and Return 
Dependent variable Invest2 Invest2 Return2 Return2 
Specification 
(1) 
Probit 
(2) 
Probit 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
Promise1<9 -0.05 -0.07 -0.85 -0.97 
    [dummy for promises less than 9 in Game1] (0.36) (0.36) (0.79) (0.78) 
Promise1>11 -0.37 -0.21 2.67* 1.73 
    [dummy for promises greater than 11 in Game1] (0.65) (0.70) (1.45) (1.47) 
Return1 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.03 
    [return in Game1] (0.12) (0.12) (0.26) (0.26) 
Broken1 -0.80* -0.84* 0.86 1.86 
    [broken promise in Game1] (0.48) (0.49) (1.33) (1.36) 
Broken1 × (Promise1-Return1) -0.07 -0.10 -0.58* -0.64** 
    [extent of under-return relative to Game1 promise] (0.11) (0.12) (0.30) (0.30) 
Distrusted1 -0.22 -0.32 -1.53 -1.35 
    [not trusted in Game1] (1.06) (1.10) (2.39) (2.38) 
Promise2<9 -1.37*** -2.13** -1.66** -1.47 
    [dummy for promises less than 9 in Game2] (0.32) (0.88) (0.74) (2.79) 
Promise2<9 × Promise2   0.11  -0.01 
    [amount promised in Game2 for promises < 9]  (0.12)  (0.38) 
Promise2>11 -0.14 2.20 0.78 -12.01** 
    [dummy for promises greater than 11 in Game2] (0.42) (1.90) (1.05) (4.64) 
Promise2>11 × Promise2   -0.14  0.80*** 
    [amount promised in Game1 for promises > 11]  (0.11)  (0.28) 
Constant 2.05* 2.26* 8.98*** 8.83*** 
 (1.13) (1.17) (2.51) (2.48) 
Observations 229 229 200 200 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Table 3: Game 2 Determinants of Investment and Return with Game 1 Promise-Keepers  
Dependent variable Invest2 Invest2 Return2 Return2 
Specification 
(1) 
Probit 
(2) 
Probit 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
Return1 0.15 0.11 -0.01 -0.05 
    [return in Game 1] (0.15) (0.15) (0.21) (0.21) 
Message 0.63* 0.61 -0.24 -0.24 
    [message with content] (0.38) (0.38) (0.63) (0.63) 
Promise2<9 -1.12*** -4.39** -2.23*** -9.13 
    [dummy for promises less than 9 in Game2] (0.43) (2.21) (0.69) (5.57) 
Promise2<9 × Promise2   0.45  0.92 
    [amount promised in Game2 for promises < 9]  (0.30)  (0.74) 
Promise2>11 -1.83** -1.82** 9.12*** 9.08*** 
    [dummy for promises greater than 11 in Game2] (0.80) (0.81) (2.01) (2.00) 
Constant 0.29 0.63 9.23*** 9.58*** 
 (1.42) (1.47) (2.04) (2.06) 
Observations 155 155 143 143 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
 
Table 4: Game 2 Determinants of Investment and Return with Game 1 Promise-Breakers 
Dependent variable Invest2 Invest2 Return2 Return2 
Specification 
(1) 
Probit 
(2) 
Probit 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
Return1 0.10 -0.11 0.69*** 1.15** 
    [return in Game 1] (0.08) (0.15) (0.24) (0.46) 
Promise2-Promise1 0.21*  -0.46  
    [promise adjustment] (0.13)  (0.45)  
Promise1-Return1  -0.21*  0.46 
    [extent of under-return relative to Game1 promise]  (0.13)  (0.45) 
Apology 1.88*** 1.88*** 2.69 2.69 
    [message with apology] (0.68) (0.68) (3.19) (3.19) 
Promise2 -0.09 0.13 0.37 -0.09 
    [amount promised in Game 2] (0.12) (0.08) (0.48) (0.29) 
Constant -0.56 -0.56 -1.90 -1.90 
 (1.58) (1.58) (6.24) (6.24) 
Observations 36 36 25 25 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
 
Table 5: Game 2 Determinants of Investment and Return with Game 1 Distrusted Trustees 
Dependent variable Invest2 Return2 
Specification 
(1) 
Probit 
(2) 
OLS 
Promise1=10 -0.86 2.51 
    [dummy for promises equal to 10 in Game1] (0.70) (2.16) 
Wordcount 0.02 0.00 
    [number of words] (0.01) (0.04) 
Promise2=10 1.40* 0.08 
    [dummy for promises equal to 10 in Game2] (0.76) (1.89) 
Constant 0.38 6.28*** 
 (0.47) (1.73) 
Observations 38 32 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Figure 1: Aggregate Distribution of Decisions in Games 1 and 2 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Promises in Game 1 (Resulting in IN or OUT) 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Promises in Game 2 (Resulting in IN or OUT)   
by Game 1 Promise-Keepers 
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Figure 4: Distribution of Promises in Game 2 (Resulting in IN or OUT) 
by Game 1 Promise-Breakers 
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Appendix A: Instructions for Trust Game 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make 
decisions in a particular situation. Feel free to ask us questions as they arise, by raising your hand. Please do not 
speak to other participants during the experiment. You will receive $7 for participating in this session. You may also 
receive additional money, depending on the decisions made (as described below). Upon completion of the session, 
this additional amount will be paid to you individually and privately.  
During the session, you will be paired with another person. However, no participant will ever know the 
identity of the person with whom he or she is paired. 
 
 
DECISION TASKS 
 
In each pair, one person will have the role of A, and the other will have the role of B. The amount of money 
you earn depends on the decisions made in your pair. 
First, by choosing a dollar amount from $0 to $20, B indicates the proportion of a possible $20 income that 
he or she promises to transfer back to A, should A choose IN. Specifically, B will complete the following statement: 
“I (Participant B) promise to transfer back ___ of my income to you (Participant A) if you choose IN”. The 
computer will convey B’s statement to A, and then A and B will proceed as described below. B may still choose an 
amount to transfer back to A that is different than the amount promised. 
Having received a statement from B, A indicates whether he or she chooses IN or OUT. If A chooses OUT, 
A receives $5 and B receives $0. If A chooses IN, then B receives $20 income. In such a case, after receiving $20 
income, B must choose a dollar amount from $0 to $20 to transfer back to A.   
 
 
SURVEY 
 
After having completed the decision tasks described above you will be asked to fill out a short 20 item 
survey. 
 
 
DIAGRAM 
 
The following diagram represents how the experiment proceeds:  
 
B makes a promise: 
“I (Person B) promise to transfer back 
___ of my income to you (Person A) if 
you choose IN” 
A chooses: IN or OUT 
IN OUT 
promise 
B chooses: the amount ($X) from $0 
to $20 to transfer back to A. 
amount X 
A’s Earnings: $5 
B’s Earnings: $0 
A’s Earnings: $X 
B’s Earnings: $20-$X 
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(This part of the instructions was handed out after the first part of the experiment was conducted.) 
 
 
REPETITION OF THE EXPERIMENT 
 
The same decision tasks that were just completed will be repeated again, with everyone remaining in the 
same A or B roles and paired with the same participants as in the previous tasks. 
 
 
MESSAGE 
 
Prior to repetition of the previous decision tasks, B has an option to send a message to A. B may use a text 
box to type a message, if desired. We will allow time as needed to construct and type messages. When B’s message 
has been completed (by typing in the text box and clicking on the send button) it will be conveyed by the computer 
to the appropriate Participant A, and then A and B will proceed with decision tasks. In these messages, no one is 
allowed to identify him or herself by name, number, gender, or appearance. Other than these restrictions, B may say 
anything in the message. If you wish not to send a message, simply click on the send button without having typed 
anything in the message box. 
 
 
DECISION TASKS AND SURVEY (REPEATED AS BEFORE) 
 
This second set of decision tasks and the accompanying 20 item survey is the final part of the experiment. 
There will be no further tasks. 
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Appendix B: Instructions for Coders 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
You will be playing a MATCHING GAME with two other students, called your partners. Your payment 
for the matching game depends not only on what you do, but also on what your partners do, and on the rules of the 
matching game described below. Make sure you understand the rules. Feel free to ask us questions as they arise, by 
raising your hand. Please do not speak to other students during the experiment. You will receive $7 for participating 
in this session. You may also receive additional money, depending on the decisions you and the two other students 
make. Upon completion of the session, this additional amount will be paid to you individually and privately.  
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Over the last two years, many Chapman students like you came to our lab to participate in economic 
experiments which we call “trust games.” In these games, each participant was paired with another participant. All 
participants interacted via computer terminals and the interaction was anonymous. That is, no participant knew the 
identity of the person with whom they were paired. In each pair, one person had the role of A, and the other had the 
role of B. 
The trust game proceeded in several stages. First, by choosing a dollar amount from $0 to $20, B indicated 
the proportion of a possible $20 income that he or she promised to transfer back to A, should A choose IN. 
Specifically, B completed the following statement: “I (Participant B) promise to transfer back ___ of my income to 
you (Participant A) if you choose IN”. Both B and A understood these promises to be non-binding. The computer 
conveyed B’s statement to A. Having received a statement from B, A chose either IN or OUT. If A chose OUT, A 
received $5 and B received $0. If A chose IN, B received $20 income. In such a case, after receiving $20 income, B 
chose a dollar amount from $0 to $20 to transfer back to A. 
Then we presented exactly the same trust game to the same participants once again. Neither participant A 
nor participant B knew that there would be an unexpected second trust game. After learning the outcome of the first 
trust game (from now on we will call it Game 1) and after the unexpected second game (Game 2) was announced, 
but before it commenced, B could send a one-way message to A – saying anything that did not personally identify 
them. 
You are NOT playing these trust games! Instead, you and your partners will play the matching game.  
 
 
MATCHING GAME 
 
In the matching game you will be examining the messages sent by B to A. Specifically, we will present to 
you 36 messages that were sent by B to A after B learned that there would be a Game 2. In all 36 instances, in Game 
1, B promised to return a certain amount and then after A chose IN, B chose to transfer back to A an amount that 
was lower than the amount promised. We will call these participants “promise-breakers,” since they broke their 
promises in Game 1 by returning less than they promised they would. 
Your job, and that of your partners in the matching game, is to make judgments about whether these written 
messages sent by promise-breakers after Game 1 and before Game 2 qualify as either of two definitions of 
“apologies.” You and your partners are trying to match your judgments about each of the messages. The more 
messages you match, the more you earn. Another way of thinking about this is as follows: You are trying to guess 
how your two partners will judge each message you all see and to make matching judgments yourself. The more 
accurate your guess about their judgments, the more money you can make. 
We will provide you with participant-specific data on the Game 1 promise made, the Game 1 return made, 
and the subsequent message sent. Then, you and your partners will have to answer YES or NO to the following two 
questions:  
Does the message qualify as an apology according to apology definition 1? 
Does the message qualify as an apology according to apology definition 2?  
 
We cannot tell you how to play this matching game. Obviously, a lot of doing well depends on what your 
partners do. However, we recommend that, as you read each message, you and your partners pay attention to what 
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you expect most people would interpret according to definition 1 and definition 2. We recommend that you DO 
NOT think too deeply about it. If you and your partners coordinate on the same intuitive approach, your initial 
interpretations should be most likely to pay off in this game. They are more likely to be similar for you and your 
partners than alternative interpretations produced by any deep thinking. 
 
TWO DEFINITIONS OF APOLOGY THAT YOU WILL MAKE QUALIFYING JUDGEMENTS ABOUT 
 
Apology definition 1: an explicit or implicit acknowledgment of offense which another has 
received 
 
Apology definition 2: an explicit or implicit acknowledgment of offense which another has 
received, along with remorse, regret, or sorrow stemming from acknowledgment of offense 
 
 
EARNINGS 
 
You earn money in the matching game by making a judgment that agrees with the majority judgment of the 
group. In other words, if you match your judgment with at least one other partner – the two of you who have 
matched have formed a majority (i.e., at least 2 out of 3) and will be rewarded with $5 if the item you matched on is 
chosen for payment. If your judgment about a message does not match either of your partners’, you will not earn a 
money reward for that judgment.  
Specifically, for each of the 36 messages you view, you will make YES or NO judgments in each of two 
columns that follow. In the first column you will circle either YES or NO, depending whether you think that the 
message content qualifies as an apology according to definition 1. In the second column you will circle either YES 
or NO, depending on whether you think that the message content qualifies as an apology according to definition 2. 
Then for each individual message we will compare your judgment with judgments of the two other students. To 
calculate your earnings at the end of the experiment, we will randomly choose 3 out of 36 judgments in the first 
column and 3 out of 36 judgments in the second column for payment, using a bingo cage which contains balls 
numbered from 1 to 36. Since for each correct judgment you can earn $5, you can earn up to $30 for the matching 
game in addition to the $7 participation fee. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
We will distribute to you a set of 36 Game 1 promise-breaker’s promise and return decisions and 
subsequent messages. In all, you will view 36 messages. Each message will be followed by two columns, each with 
YES or NO. In the first column you will circle either YES or NO, depending whether you think that the message 
content qualifies as an apology according to definition 1. In the second column you will circle either YES or NO, 
depending on whether you think that the message content qualifies as an apology according to definition 2. 
Since we will choose three judgments in column 1 and three judgments in column 2, each potentially 
earning a reward of $5.00, you can earn up to $30 for the matching game. You additionally will earn $7 for showing 
up on time and participating. 
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Appendix C: Promises and Messages 
 
Table C1: Promise-Breakers Messages 
Promised 
Game 1 
Returned 
Game 1 
Message  Word-
count 
Broad 
Apology 
Narrow 
Apology 
Promised 
Game 2 
Trusted? 
Game 2 
Returned 
Game 2 
15 0 Let's split even. $10 and $10. 6 YES NO 10 YES 8 
10 1 If I knew there were 2 rounds I would have 
split it up even the first round.  This round I'll 
make it up to you by giving you 15 if you're IN, 
this way we both end up with more money.  
Sorry again. 
43 YES YES 15 YES 3 
10 0 Hey im sorry about that I didn't realize there 
was going to be another round.! Let me make 
things right. 
20 YES YES 15 YES 5 
10 9 i'll do the same deal as last time, sound fair? 10 NO NO 15 YES 9 
10 7 to even out i will give you 13 and i will take 7 13 YES YES 13 YES 10 
10 0 dooooooood we all here to make muney baby 
so why dont we just split this huney down da 
middle,  a lil lovin for da both of us? ill 
forrealze give you like 10 bucks and ill keep 10 
you dig? stay fresh ;) 
43 YES NO 10 YES 0 
10 7 How much would you want this time seeing 
how you didn't have a choice last time? I'm 
willing to make it even between the two of us. 
27 YES NO 13 YES 0 
10 5 Hello A! I'm sorry I fell back on my promise, 
haha. To be honest, I'm dead broke and I 
haven't eaten all day and I'm literally about to 
run out of gas in my car, and those extra five 
dollars are going to help me out with that!  ¶ If 
you choose out the most you are going to get is 
5 more dollars, I can promise you that I'll agree 
to give you $10 if you choose in. Hopefully this 
works out! Either way, have a good one! 
88 YES NO 12 YES 12 
8 5 I only sent less than promised because I wanted 
to see what would happen 
14 YES NO 10 YES 10 
10 2 Hi, I was a little confused as to the experiment 
before. But I will stay true to this promise 
19 YES NO 9 YES 9 
13 9 lets split the money 10 and 10 7 YES NO 10 YES 10 
10 8 I apologize for cheating you out of your $2 - 
normally I'm not the kind of person to do that 
sort of thing. When two people aren't face-to-
face they usually have more confidence to do 
things they wouldn't normally do. This time I 
promise I'll play fair. 
47 YES YES 9 YES 9 
10 7 I didn't know we were repeating this. This time 
I really will split 50/50 :) 
15 YES NO 10 YES 10 
11 2 I will transfer back 18 to you this time to make 
it fair ¶  so we will have the same amount. I 
promise this time. 
24 YES YES 18 YES 10 
14 11 Hi. I apologize for short changing you.  I 
should have been honsest and gone off the first 
example.  I went off the third example w/my 
self interest in mind.  I'll keep my word this 
time. 
35 YES YES 18 YES 18 
11 10 10/10? 1 YES NO 12 YES 7 
8 0 sorry about last time i feel bad......50/50  this 
time? 
10 YES YES 10 YES 0 
8 7 Strategy :) 1 YES NO 10 YES 10 
10 0 I feel bad that you now only have the option of 
going home with $5 so you should click in 
again and i will give you $12 so that you go 
home with more than just the basic amount 
possible 
40 YES YES 12 YES 0 
8 6 My sincerest appologies on that last one...I do 
feel quite guilty ¶  and I assure you that this 
34 YES YES 16 YES 1 
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time I shall keep my promise with utmost 
integrity.  You have my word as an honest 
gentleman. 
10 7 I feel bad for promising 10 and giving you 7. If 
you choose in I'll send you 13 so that we'll 
come out even. 
24 YES YES 13 YES 13 
5 1 my bad... 2 YES NO 10 YES 8 
10 3 I'll transfer back more money this time ¶  
actually $10 
9 YES YES 11 YES 10 
10 8 Hi ¶ I was testing if it really will let me decide 
how much I can get myself. This time I will 
give you the right amount I promised. 
28 YES NO 10 YES 10 
10 0   0 NO NO 20 YES 0 
10 0 This time I'll give you what I promise.  Sorry! 9 YES YES 10 NO  
10 0 ok for real this time haha. The first time was a 
joke lol 
13 YES NO 15 NO  
17 0 May God bless you 4 NO NO 13 NO  
10 7 In the previous exercise I wanted to see if one 
really could promise one amount and then give 
another. After seeing that it is possible, I 
promise to give you the amount I state. 
34 YES NO 10 NO  
17 1 i know that there is no reason you'd trust me 
because i didn't follow through with my 
promise last time ¶ but if you choose in i will 
transfer all of the money that i say i will. ¶ for 
real this time. 
41 YES YES 18 NO  
10 5 Even though I was decietful ¶ you were no 
worse off then had you picked OUT.  The other 
option would have still led you to $5. 
25 YES NO 5 NO  
12 5  0 NO NO 20 NO  
18 4  0 NO NO 12 NO  
7 6  0 NO NO 9 NO  
10 5  0 NO NO 8 NO  
10 7  0 NO NO 10 NO  
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Table C2: Distrusted Trustees Messages 
Promised  
Game 1 
Message Word-
count 
Promised 
Game 2 
Trusted? 
Game 2 
Returned 
Game 2 
11 8 seems fair  8 YES 0 
16 lets go 50/50. i give you $10, i get $10. ¶ its almost christmas....  10 YES 1 
9 I want to split the money right down the middle. I will give you ten dollars and I 
will get ten dollars.  If you choose out you will get less and both of us will come 
out empty handed. This is for the benefit of both parties and you will make 
more money in this way than you will by opting out. 
 10 YES 1 
5 hey if i transfer 9 to you will you accept ?  9 YES 8 
10 Trust me this time. Please?  10 YES 7 
10 hi! i was actually going to give you the $10 that time! You would have made 
more money! I promise to give what I promise to you this time as well! 
 8 YES 5 
11 Hello, ¶ I think $11.00 for you is a fair price for this survey and it is more than 
the $5.00 you get for choosing Out. I will keep my offer the same if you chose 
In. ¶ Thank you 
 11 YES 12 
10 Hey! Okay, listen, I was genuinely going to give you ten dollars. I think it 
makes sense for both of us to make as much money as possible. I'm not trying 
to trick you. I'm just poor and want a few extra dollars to buy Christmas 
presents. So could you please just be in" next time? That way we can both make 
more. I promise I am not lying to you. I know it's anonymous but please trust 
me. :(" 
 9 YES 10 
6 You click out,  you earn 5. You accept my offer,  you earn 6. It doesn't make 
any sense to click OUT. This is not a situation where my gain affects your 
profits in the future, this isn't one business earning a little bit and another 
earning a lot at its expense. You have to option of $6 or $5,  without 
repercussions or any damage in the future. Me getting 0 does you no good,  all 
it does is hurt you. If you want $5,  click OUT. But it obviously makes more 
sense to click IN. 
 6 YES 7 
1 If I offer you at least 30% of my income we both make more than if you opt out.  7 YES 7 
8 How about 10? We will both make the same amount evenly.  10 YES 10 
10 I am a person of my word. I will transfer back $10 so we both make the same 
amount of money and more money than if you pick OUT 
 10 YES 10 
10 I will offer 10 dollars of my income to you. If you choose in, then you will 
recieve 10 dollars and i will recieve 10 dollars. If you choose out, you will only 
recieve 5 dollars. 
 10 YES 10 
20 I will split it with you so we both get ten dollars.  10 YES 10 
6   9 YES 9 
6 Please trust me when I say I will give you the amount I will promise you. This 
way, we will both earn more money instead of you just earnint $5 and me 
earning nothing. Let's take all of their money together! 
 7 YES 7 
5 I will transfer 10 dollars.  10 YES 10 
5 Hey ¶  to make this a win-win situation for both of us ¶  I'll transfer $10 and that 
way both of us will earn the same amount. It's really a good gameplan. :) 
 0 YES 8 
7 Ok ¶  so this time let's make it actually fair.... I should have made it even last 
time. So this time if I give you back $8 ¶  you'll leave with $20 and I'll leave 
with $19. you still come out on top ¶  but I don't mind. And that's more than 
you'll make if you click OUT. I'm in the same boat as you....I too am poor as 
hell and would like to make some easy cash.... 
 8 YES 8 
20 I will transfer you back 75% back.  10 YES 0 
5 We can figure out a way to divide the amount of the $20 equally if the result 
from that will have us leave here with more than $7 
 10 YES 9 
10 I won't ask you to trust me.  That's your choice ¶  what I will say though is offer 
you $10 to each of us.  We both walk away from this evenly and both  better off 
than we came in. 
 10 YES 10 
4 I promise to transfer back 20 of my income to you. I really need this extra 
money. I hope you understand 
 20 YES 0 
9 Let's be fair and split the pool evenly. Trust that I will not go back on what I 
say. 
 10 YES 10 
6 I will give you half of the amount of the income  12 YES 0 
5 Hello A ¶ I'm stoked to be making money while my roomate snores away. 
Hahaha. ¶ Cha-ching ly ¶ B.¶ 
 4 YES 4 
20 if i say $20 and you accpet ¶ I promise to give you $20 back so we both leave 
with $20 ¶  the max amount 
 20 YES 20 
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8 I promise to uphold any deals set before me  10 YES 10 
6 I promise to give you $7 for clicking "in." I guarantee it. As I see it ¶  this gives 
you $2 more dollars than you would recieve by clicking "out." It's a win-win 
situation. 
 7 YES 7 
8   10 YES 0 
5 I think you should choose IN because it is simple game theory. If you choose IN 
and I choose to give you $10 ¶  which I promise to give you ¶  then we both 
win.  I know that you would automatically want to choose OUT so that you can 
get $5 no matter what ¶  but I promise you that you will get $10. We both want 
to get money ¶  and this is a good way to share our earnings. I hope you choose 
IN! :) 
 5 YES 0 
10 If I offered you 10$ why would you rather get 5?  10 YES 10 
6 Ouch. ): I'm not gonna scam you, dude. When I make a promise, I make a 
promise. We both make more money this way; it's good all around! 
 6 NO  
5 hey Participant a make a deal dont do like this we should come here to earn 
money kul 
 1 NO  
10 dont be an asshole  7 NO  
10 Trust me.  10 NO  
6 You'll get more than $5.  8 NO  
8 Hello there! So it's probably hard to trust me ¶  in that I will return your money? 
And I would quite frankly feel the same way. The thing is though that you don't 
know me but I know me and I know that when I make a promise I keep it. I 
hope you can trust in me. :) 
 7 NO  
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Table C3: Promise-Keepers Messages 
Promised Returned Message Word-
count 
Promised 
Game 2 
Trusted? 
Game 2 
Returned 
Game 2 
6 14 I paid out more than I promised to transfer back the first time as a reward 
for going IN 
 10 YES 0 
6 6 merry christmas!  10 YES 10 
10 10 Same deal as before sounds about right, in my opinion.  10 YES 10 
8 8 i guess you need the money too so we should split it!  10 YES 10 
10 10 Hey there. Want to do the same thing again,  and both come out ahead?  10 YES 10 
9 9 hey so 10 and 10 this time?  10 YES 10 
10 10 I will split it equally  10 YES 10 
10 10 Thanks for accepting my last offer. I promise to always uphold my side 
of the deal. 
 10 YES 10 
9 9 hello A! :)  7 YES 7 
7 7 I won't lie to you. I know we're all broke college students here who need 
to make money. ugh 
 8 YES 8 
10 10 This is tres bizarre.  10 YES 10 
5 5 i send you 10 and you hit in..that way we both get the same amount of 
money. =] 
 10 YES 10 
10 10 Let's do the same thing,  that way we both get the max amount of money  10 YES 0 
10 10 we'll go 50/50 on everything. i promise.  10 YES 10 
6 6 we're a good pair. i dont know what else to say haha.  6 YES 1 
11 11 expecto patronum!  11 YES 2 
10 10 Pleasure doing business with you :)  10 YES 10 
9 9 :) I dont know what to say haha but ill split it 50 50 this time for you  10 YES 10 
10 10 Let's make some MONEY :) click in on all of them and i'll try and make 
it as fair as possible. 
 10 YES 10 
9 9 I hope you are satisfied with the amount of money I offered you.  I will 
offer more this time. 
 10 YES 10 
10 10 I don't really have anything to say...let's split the money 10-10 again  10 YES 10 
10 10 $10 is better than $5. Trust me, I'm a doctor haha  10 YES 10 
6 6   6 YES 6 
7 7 I will do exactly the same thing as I did before.  7 YES 7 
10 10 Lets split it 11/ 9 everytime, that way we both get more money IN than 
OUT? sound good? I don't think you can answer me. . . 
 9 YES 9 
6 6 Again I will promise $6. Please choose IN as it will maximize the profit 
that both of us can potentially made. I promise that I will send the full 
amount and if we can trust each other i will increase the amount I send in 
the following round. Thank you. 
 6 YES 6 
10 10 Same as last time? It's only fair we earn the same amount.  10 YES 10 
10 10 hi. i think it's best when we split it! makes it fair for everyone  10 YES 10 
10 10 ill give u ten everytime if you choose IN then we both get ten dollars 
everytime we both go home with the same amount of money. again ten 
dollars a piece everytime go home with same amt. :) 
 10 YES 10 
10 10   10 YES 10 
6 6 want to choose in and then we take half? 10 each?  10 YES 10 
8 8   8 YES 8 
10 10 Let's keep going 50/50  10 YES 10 
7 7 I promise to transfer you more money than last time.  9 YES 9 
9 9 Hi, hope you're content with the $9  10 YES 10 
10 10 Let's split the 20 evenly, 10-10  10 YES 10 
10 10 Want to just split it again?  10 YES 10 
10 10 same thing as before, we both might as well walk out with enough for 
gas money! 
 10 YES 10 
10 10 same thing?  10 YES 10 
       
9 9   9 YES 9 
10 10 I will keep it equal like last time.  10 YES 10 
8 10   7 YES 9 
9 9   9 YES 9 
8 8 Same as before Ill send you 8. We both get more $$ that way!  8 YES 0 
10 10 Same deal.  10 YES 10 
10 10   10 YES 10 
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8 8   8 YES 5 
10 10 i promise to do 50/50 again  10 YES 10 
8 8   8 YES 8 
8 8 hey, so i just want you to know that i'll probably sent you $8 or $9! nice 
working with you! 
 8 YES 8 
10 10 I like the way we did it last time, it works out nicely for both of us and 
it's fair :) ¶ Thanks for being great! 
 10 YES 10 
10 10 I will be fair.  10 YES 10 
6 6 Hi A! :)  9 YES 6 
8 8 I'm going to do the same thing.  8 YES 9 
9 9 I hope you're having a great day!  8 YES 8 
9 9 Teamwork!  10 YES 10 
10 10 I promise not to screw you out of any money and to transfer back what I 
say I will. If you choose in¶ we'll both benefit more! =D¶ 
 8 YES 8 
10 10 Don't worry, we'll evenly split the money this time, too, just like last 
time. I won't try to scam you or anything, because that's below me. 
You'll get the 10 dollars that I promise you. :) 
 10 YES 10 
10 10 I'm not a risk taker and I'm not a dick. I said I'd give back ten before, and 
I did. We both want money. You can make $5 or $10 because I will give 
you ten again. yayyy money=)) 
 10 YES 10 
10 10 If we do this again, i'm always going to keep it equal for both of us.  10 YES 10 
10 10 Hi, so I know it's hard to trust someone who you don't even know but I'll 
be I'll do my best to make things work. 
 9 YES 9 
10 10 I figure we are both equally desperate for cash.  10 YES 10 
9 9 Hi Participant A ¶ I hope you trust me due to the previous round. I will 
take care of you and uphold to my promises, if you take care of me. 
Deal? Now lets do this and make some bank! ¶ ¶ Signed, ¶ Participant B 
 10 YES 10 
8 8 I'm going to offer $8 again. Hopefully you choose IN. That way we can 
both make a profit. 
 8 YES 8 
10 10 Have you ever done this before?  10 YES 10 
10 10   10 YES 10 
10 10 Same thing? Seems fair? ...  10 YES 10 
9 9 i promise i will give you what i say i will  10 YES 10 
10 10 Thanks, glad we're both making a good amount of money! It's tough 
starting us off though! Wish you the best! 
 10 YES 5 
10 10 Hello. Hope this doesn't sound creepy or anything. I think we should 
work together to get out of here with the same amount of money. I'm 
going to send over 10 again. :) 
 10 YES 10 
10 10 I think each of us getting 10 dollars is fair. do you agree?  10 YES 10 
8 8 same as last time :)  8 YES 8 
9 9   9 YES 9 
10 10 You can trust me :)  10 YES 10 
10 10 Keep it even again  10 YES 10 
10 10 i chose to give $10 dollars and gave you $10 in that last part. i hope we 
get paid 
 10 YES 10 
10 10 I'm going to do the same thing as last time, 10 for you and 10 for me. We 
both would then walk away with 27 dollars :) 
 10 YES 10 
8 8   8 YES 8 
       
9 9   9 YES 9 
10 10 Hope you like the wind....  10 YES 10 
8 8 Were you happy with the outcome?  9 YES 9 
10 10 Hey if you accept the $10 then we both make that everytime and thats 
the most mutually beneficial. 
 10 YES 10 
10 10 Same thing again. We both benefit.  10 YES 10 
10 10 hi! let's split the money 50/50 and each get 10 every time  10 YES 10 
7 7   7 YES 7 
10 10 Thanks for choosing IN :) hopefully if we do the same thing again we'll 
both make $20 each? thanks! 
 10 YES 10 
10 10 Hello ¶  I wanted to make things 50/50. I don't really understand but that 
seemed fair to me at least 
 10 YES 10 
7 7 I have no idea what to say here. This is a nice text box?  8 YES 1 
9 9 I believe example 1 seemed the fairest for the position i was given. I did 
not want to be unfair however it seemed necessary to try and make a 
profit. I chose the smallest profit option which gave us both money in the 
end. 
 9 YES 9 
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10 10 I'll give you $10 just like before if you say "IN." ¶ It's a win-win (I get 
$10 instead of $0 and you get $10 instead of $5 if you were to say 
"OUT." 
 10 YES 10 
7 7 I need a nap...  11 YES 10 
10 10 Let's just do that same transfer again  10 YES 10 
8 8 =]  9 YES 9 
10 10 Hi there ¶  just trying to keep things equal and honest ¶ now let's get 
some solid earnings again! :) 
 10 YES 10 
8 8 This is a haiku. ¶ I am glad you trusted me¶ This way we both win!  8 YES 10 
7 7   8 YES 8 
9 9 Please remember that if you say OUT ¶  you only get $5. I PROMISE 
you that I will not give you under that if you say IN ¶  I promise. 
 7 YES 6 
10 10 You're in good hands. Win/win.  10 YES 10 
10 10 I want to keep this fair and even!  10 YES 10 
10 10   10 YES 10 
9 9 I'm glad you trusted me and went with IN ¶  I'm gonna do the same thing 
again so hopefully you go with IN again :) 
 9 YES 9 
10 10 hi. i liked how we did it the first time. hopefully u did too  10 YES 0 
10 10 I will send you 10 if you select IN ¶  10 YES 10 
9 9 $6 is the minimum offer to accept...anything higher your making more $ 
just off genorosity 
 10 YES 6 
10 10   10 YES 10 
9 9 Good deal! I'll up the transfer a to make it a litte more fair  10 YES 0 
9 9 This time I'm going to promise 11 back to you ¶  and since you've seen I 
keep my promise ¶  when you click IN I will give you back 11 so we 
both walk out of here with 20. I don't break promises. 
 11 YES 11 
9 9 50/50 ¶  sound good?  10 YES 10 
10 10   10 YES 10 
8 8 I'll give you exactly what I promise  10 YES 10 
6 7   10 YES 8 
10 10 just wanted to say hello :) have a nice day!  10 YES 10 
10 10 Heyo- happy to work with you again ¶  and do the same thing.  10 YES 10 
10 10 Hi! I'm going to split the money evenly. Have a nice day!  10 YES 10 
9 9 Let's split it half and half ¶  ten dollars.  10 YES 10 
10 10 Hello "A". Based on our last experiment we have established trust ¶  so 
thanks for making that happen!  I will repeat the same steps as last time 
to ensure that we both get the same amount of money at our maximum 
level ¶  10$ each.it makes no sense to betray each other because we just 
come out of this thing with less money on both parts. Lets get rich!! 
 10 YES 1 
10 10 im going to offer you 10 again ¶  take it and we can profti equally  10 YES 0 
9 9 Hey just to let you know ¶  I try my best to never lie in life and I include 
this experiment part of my life standard so I won't lie. 
 6 YES 6 
10 10 Hey. same amount ¶  same money ¶  we both leave with 27 buck in our 
pocket. =] 
 10 YES 10 
10 10 Teamwork + Honesty = $$$$¶  8 YES 8 
7 7 I Hate Mondays¶                         -Garfield  17 YES 16 
10 10   10 YES 10 
8 8 Hey! So I want to make money ¶  just as much as you do ¶  so why dont 
we call it even and I promise $10 ¶  you accept ¶  and we get out of here! 
=D Thanks 
 10 YES 10 
10 10 Pay it forward. ¶ Have a great day.  10 YES 10 
7 7   7 YES 7 
10 10 Yay! great teamwork last time. I think we should do the same thing again 
this time. That way we both get the maximum amount of money. Hope 
that sounds good! :] 
 10 YES 10 
10 10 hi hope your doing well. i plan on doing the same thing as before  10 YES 10 
10 10 50-50 :]  10 YES 10 
10 10 Same thing?  10 YES 0 
10 10 I think we should do $10 each again ¶  works out best for the both of us.  10 YES 10 
9 9 Let's do the same...It worked and we both made some money!!!!  9 YES 9 
10 10 Hey beautiful. I hopee your having a good day. Truthfully ¶  I'll get you 
more money if you say IN. 
 10 YES 8 
9 9 well we worked together so far- want to do it again? at least we'll both 
make more than $5 
 7 YES 7 
10 10   10 YES 0 
9 9 i will keep my promise!  9 YES 9 
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10 10 trust me  20 YES 20 
7 7 I'm not quite sure what to say ¶  but hi!:)  10 YES 0 
9 9 lets do this!  10 YES 15 
9 9   10 YES 10 
9 9 same deal.  9 YES 9 
10 10   10 YES 8 
9 9   10 YES 10 
9 9 I'm not entirely sure what I'm supposed to say ¶  BUT point is I promise 
I will not jip you out of money. What I promise is what you'll get and I 
hope you will not jip me out of any money either :) 
 9 YES 9 
6 6   7 NO  
9 9   10 NO  
7 7 I'm planning on offering the same amount so we can potentially just do 
the same thing as before 
 7 NO  
8 8 choose IN ¶  i will transfer you the promised amount of $  9 NO  
8 8   7 NO  
10 10 we need eachother to make money.  20 NO  
8 8 Hi  7 NO  
7 7   7 NO  
9 9   8 NO  
8 8 We the People of the United States of America, ¶ Inorder to form a more 
perfect Union, ¶ Do ordain and establish this constitution of the United 
States... 
 8 NO  
10 10   5 NO  
6 6 I'll promise to transfer whatever amount I say  6 NO  
 
 
 
 
